CUTTING THE CORD: REMOVING THE

CMRS

SPECTRUM

CAP TO PROMOTE WIRELESS-LANDLINE CONVERGENCE

AND WIRELESS ALTERNATIVES IN THE LOCAL Loop
William C. Beckwith

"Our children's children will see old movies with wired
phones and wonder why anybody ever used them."1

the concerns that gave rise to the spectrum aggregation limitation.

2
"Your wireless phone may become your only phone."

I.

INTRODUCTION

SYLLABUS
This comment addresses a Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") proceeding in which the Commission is considering
whether to modify or remove its existing rule that
limits the aggregate amount of spectrum that can
be licensed or attributed to a single wireless carrier. It analyzes issues raised in that proceeding
and explains why the outcome of the proceeding
should be the elimination of the spectrum aggregation limitation. The author argues that the rule
impedes innovation, the deployment of new services, delivery of service to unserved or underserved areas and the development of wireless service as a significant competitor of - if not a
substitute for - traditional wireline service. Furthermore, this comment proposes that the spectrum aggregation limitation should be removed
because the objective of the rule, meaningful
competition in the wireless market, has been attained. Finally, the author submits that other
more effective mechanisms are in place to address

Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") is
a dynamic wireless industry sector that for many
customers may become a substitute for traditional
wireline telephony in the United States. Nicholas
Negroponte3 correctly predicted the transformation that has occurred in the communications
markets in a phrase that has come to be known as
the "Negroponte Switch": "Phones, largely
wired . . . [will] go wireless, and TV, largely wire-

4
less, [will] get wired."
According to the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association ("CTIA"), the number of
U.S. wireless customers has exploded from 1.6
5
million to over 66 million in the last decade.

This figure could reach 110 million in 2002.6

Wireless consumers also have experienced dramatic price drops in recent history as new wireless
technologies have been deployed. 7 FCC Commissioner Susan Ness has remarked that the growth
of competition in recent years has resulted in impressive benefits to consumers.8 'Just a few years
ago, a wireless call commonly cost 50 or 75 cents a

1 A Cell Phone in Every Pocket?, Bus. WK. at 38, Jan. 18,
1999, available at 1999 WL 8225622 (quoting Andrew Cole,
head of Renaissance Worldwide Inc.'s wireless practice).
2 AT&T Digital One Rate (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http:/

1999, available at 1999 WL 8225622.
6
See id.
7
See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and

/www.attws.com/personal/onerate/main.html>.
3
Head of the Media Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of

Analysis of.Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to

Technology and former essayist for Wired magazine. See
Nicholas Negroponte (visited Apr. 24, 1999) <http://www.
media.mit.edu/-nicholas/>.
4
Nicholas Negroponte, Wireless Revisited, Aug. 1, 1997
(visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.media.mit.edu/
-nicholas/Wired/WIRED5-08.html>.
5
See A Cell Phone in Every Pocket?, Bus. WK. at 38, Jan. 18,

Commercial Mobile Services, Third Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 19746
at 19769 (rel. June 11, 1998) [hereinafter Third CMRS Competition Report] (noting that price reductions are due in some

degree to the competitive effect of recent CMRS efitrants).
8 Remarks of FCC Commissioner Susan Ness Before the
Federal Communications Bar Ass'n, Washington, D.C., Jan.
20, 1999 (visited April 24, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/ness/spmain.htm>.
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minute [and involved] hefty roaming fees. But
when the first PCS provider challenged the cellular incumbents, rates plummeted 25%. They
dropped even further as the 4th, 5th, or even 6th
providers joined the fray."9 Simultaneously, these
falling prices continue to reduce profit margins
and there are predictions that wireless providers
will continue to reduce prices by 20% yearly.10
Many have attributed such remarkably sharp
growth to the laissez faire regulatory environment
engendered by Congress and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"). 1' The deregulatory trend in Congress is reflected in the 1993 amendments to sections of the
Communications Act of 1934 governing mobile
services. 1 2 Historically, FCC treatment has likewise emphasized deregulation. The Commission
has sought to foster competition by methodically
9

Id.

See A Cell Phone in Every Pocket?, Bus. WK. at -_, Jan.
18, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8225622 (quoting Andrew
Cole, head of Renaissance Worldwide Inc.'s wireless practice). "With five or six competitors in most markets, analysts
predict that price declines will average about 20% annually.
10

'Price will hemorrhage over the next two years ....

We think

you'll see 3 cents a minute in the near future."' Id.
11 See Comments of Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, WT Dkt. No. 97-207, at 4 (May 8, 1998) (citing Congressional and Commission policies that "promote
competitive results" as the main reason "[t]he CMRS industry
has achieved enormous growth in recent years.").
12
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b), 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (amending the
Communications Act of 1934 and codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 332). See also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending the Communications Act
of 1934 and to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq.)
13
See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report
and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Second Report, 12 FCC Rcd.
11266 at 11273-74 (rel. Mar. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Second
CMRS Competition Report].
14
See 47 C.F.R. § 20.6 (1998).
15
See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Spectrum
Aggregation Limits for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers, WT Dkt. No. 98-205, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
Comm. Reg. (P&F) 20-2729, para. 2 (Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter NPRM]. PCS, SMR and cellular are different CMRS
services utilizing different technologies and frequency bands.
See 47 C.F.R. § 20.3 (1998) (defining commercial mobile radio service as a mobile service that is provided for profit, i.e.,
"with the intent of receiving compensation or monetary
gain."). See also 47 CFR § 24.5 (defining PCS as "[r]adio communications that encompass mobile and ancillary fixed communication that provide services to individuals and businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing
networks.") PCS is divided into two categories: Broadband
PCS ("PCS services operating in the 1850-1890 MHz, 19301970 MHz, 2130-2150 MHz, and 2180-2200 MHz bands"),
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and consistently dismantling regulatory impediments and permitting licensees to offer supple13
mentary services over their assigned bandwidth.
One significant holdout to the deregulatory
policies directed at CMRS, however, is the Commission's rule governing the amount of CMRS
spectrum that one entity may amass in a given ge14
ographical area. Section 20.6 of the FCC's Rules
precludes a CMRS carrier from holding attributable interests in cellular, broadband PCS and Specialized Mobile Radio ("SMR") licenses if the aggregate bandwidth of those services exceeds 45
MHz in one statistical market area defined by geographical boundaries.' 5 The Commission originally adopted this CMRS spectrum cap in 1994 to
limit the aggregate PCS spectrum an entity, usually a cellular licensee, could obtain.' 6 When the
spectrum cap was first imposed, most regions of
and Narrowband PCS ("PCS services operating in the 901902 MHz, 930-931 MHz, and 940-941 MHz bands"). Id. See
also 47 CFR § 90.7 (defining a Specialized Mobile Radio System as a "radio system in which licensees provide land mobile
communications services (other than radiolocation services)
in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands on a commercial basis to
entities eligible to be licensed under [part 90 of the Commission's rules], Federal Government entities, and individuals."); 47 CFR § 22.99 (defining cellular service as "radio telecommunication services provided using a cellular system.").
A cellular system is "[a]n automated high-capacity system of
one or more multichannel base stations designed to provide
radio telecommunication services to mobile stations over a
wide area in a spectrally efficient manner. Cellular systems
employ techniques such as low transmitting power and automatic hand-off between base stations of communications in
progress to enable channels to be reused at relatively short
distances. Cellular systems may also employ digital techniques such as voice encoding and decoding, data compression, error correction, and time or code division multiple access in order to increase system capacity." Id. In addition,
these services define market areas differently. See, e.g., 47
C.F.R. § 22.909 (defining cellular markets as "standard geographic areas used by the FCC for administrative convenience in the licensing of cellular systems). Cellular markets
.comprise Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Rural
Service Areas (RSAs). All cellular markets and the counties
they comprise are listed in Public Notice Report No. CL-9240 "Common Carrier Public Mobile Services Information,
Cellular MSA/RSA Markets and Counties," dated Jan. 24,
1992, DA 92-109, 7 FCC Rcd. 742 (1992)." Id. See also, e.g., 47
C.F.R. § 24.202 ("Broadband PCS service areas are Major
Trading Areas (MTAs) and Basic Trading Areas (BTAs)....
MTAs and BTAs are based on the Rand McNally 1992 Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide, 123rd Edition, at pages 3839 ('BTA/MTA Map').... [which] organizes the 50 states
and the District of Columbia into 47 MTAs and 487 BTAs.");
47 C.F.R. § 90.7 (defining BTAs as "[s]ervice areas that are
based on the Rand McNally 1992 Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide, 123rd Edition, at pages 38-39.").
16
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 2.
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the nation were provided mobile voice services
from two facilities-based cellular carriers.1 7 The
objective of the spectrum cap, therefore, was to
create an expedient method of guaranteeing that
numerous new CMRS providers would have access
to the spectrum necessary for true wireless competition to develop.' 8 While at first blush it may appear that five years is an insufficient time to consider eliminating such a major regulation, a
review is appropriate at this time based upon the
rapid and dynamic technological innovation and
growth of the wireless industry. 19 These significant changes have raised the issue of whether the
CMRS spectrum cap is now a regulatory impediment to competition and converged services.
The 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap is one of the
most important issues to be resolved if wireless
17

18
19

See id.
See id.

See, e.g., The Council of Economic Advisors, Progress
Report: Growth and Competition in U.S. Telecommunications 1993-1998 at 14, Feb. 8, 1999 (visited Feb. 9, 1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov>. The Council summarized the explosive growth of wireless as follows:
The FCC assigned the first licenses to use radio spectrum for cellular telephone service in 1983, introducing
competition through a 'duopoly rule' under which one
license in each market was given to the incumbent local
telephone provider and another to an unaffiliated competitor. By June 1985, cellular companies altogether
had just over 200,000 subscribers, 600 'cell sites'.., and
1,700 employees. In June 1995, subscribership had
climbed to 28 million, a total of 20,000 cell sites were
operative, and the number of people employed by wireless service companies was 61,000. In 1995... the FCC
held the first auctions for broadband spectrum to be
used for digital 'personal communications services'
(PCS), creating new wireless licensees in U.S. markets.
As the successful bidders entered the market, and as subsequent licenses were auctioned, the duopoly market
structure gave way to full-fledged competition among
multiple providers. By the middle of 1998, there were
nearly 61 million cellular subscribers and over 57,000
cell sites, and by end of 1998, over 160,000 Americans
were holding jobs with wireless telephone companies.
Id.
20
The Commission observed that deployment of digital
wireless is changing the competitive landscape of CMRS:
Perhaps the most notable of these are the changes
brought about by the deployment of digital wireless services to mass market consumers. When the CMRS spectrum cap was initially adopted, mobile voice markets in
most areas of the count[ry] consisted of only two cellular
carriers. Since then, however, we have issued new
licenses authorizing the use of additional CMRS spectrum. In many areas of the country, broadband PCS
auction winners have also pursued the opportunities
presented by newer digital technologies and have begun
to provide an expanded array of mobile services. Cellular and broadband PCS providers, in turn, have also be-

service is to compete with traditional wireline service and become an alternative to the wireline local loop. The last time the FCC reviewed the relevance and necessity of CMRS spectrum
aggregation limits was in 1996. Since then, the
Commission admits, the confluence of several developments has changed conditions in CMRS
markets. 20 Moreover, the Commission acknowledged in its Third Annual CMRS Competition Report
21
that the indicia of competition are apparent.
The Commission observed noteworthy price and
service competition

22

in numerous markets.

23

Ad-

ditionally, cellular firms are investing heavily in
network upgrades and additions in order to offer
digital service. 24 Markets for mobile voice traffic
are expanding while technological innovation

gun to encounter competition from a nationwide SMR
company whose capabilities have been enhanced by acquiring new spectrum rights and its own digital strategy.
Competition is also emerging from providers of paging
services, data services, wireless e-mail and other nonvoice services. Beyond CMRS markets, there have also
been profound changes in related telecommunications
markets as the Commission implemented the Telecommunications Act of 1996. While we are encouraged by
these developments, we recognize, however, that this
emerging competition is not uniform across the country.
NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 30.
21
See Third CMRS Competition Report, supra note 7, at
19768 - 69 (June 11, 1998). See also NPRM, supra note 15, at
para. 34. "In particular, progress has been made towards
competitive mobile voice markets in many areas. In the wake
of our licensing of broadband PCS spectrum, entry by those
firms has become a reality in many local markets throughout
the United States, and further entry is continuing." Id.
22
CMRS providers routinely seek to increase subscribership by offering flat-rate pricing and bundled vertical services
such as call waiting, call forwarding, paging, etc. See, e.g., Stephanie N. Mehta, Bell Atlantic is Expected to Introduce SingleRate Programfor Wireless Users, WALL ST.J., Sept. 9, 1998, at B8
(noting Bell Atlantic's recent introduction of its Digital
Choice plan in response "to rival AT&T Corp.'s popular flatrate pricing plan for cellular-phone service.").
23
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 2 (stating that CMRS
market areas are divided into different geographical regions).
24
See generally Telecommunications Industry Association,
Press & Publications, Wireless Communications Spending Reaches
$50.2 Billion in 1998 (visited Apr. 24, 1999) <http://www.
tiaonline.org/pubs/press_releases/1999 /99-25.html> (noting that although the cellular infrastructure is mostly in place
because of expenditures over recent years, over $ 14.6 billion
is expected to be spent on CMRS infrastructure between
1999 and 2002). See also Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to the Notice of ProposedRulemaking in WT Dkt. No.
98-205, at 12-13 (Jan. 25, 1999) (stating that wireless carriers
are concentrating on developing their networks, switching to
digital service and researching advanced technological applications).
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grows apace. 25 Simultaneously, particular data
and paging services are spurring rivalry in some
markets, driving prices downward as new services
become available. 26 The FCC's recognition that
three or more CMRS competitors exist in 97% of
the largest Basic Trading Areas ("BTAs") 27 has
not been lost on cellular providers, most of whom
28
argue for removal of the cap.
Given the growing competitive environment in
the wireless markets, the Commission is examining "whether the current [CMRS spectrum cap]
continues to further the public interest, or
whether circumstances have changed so as to warrant a modification or repeal of the CMRS spectrum cap. '"29 This comment argues that the spec-

trum cap should be repealed because it is
unnecessary and, in fact, acts as an impediment to
the development of robust competition between
wireless and traditional wireline phone service.
The first prong of analysis emphasizes the Commission's inappropriate market concentration calculation methods and how meaningful competition in CMRS markets has rendered the spectrum
cap superfluous. 30 This comment next evaluates
the benefits of removing the spectrum cap, focusing on increased efficiencies, greater satisfaction
of consumer demand, expansion of service to rural markets, and advancement of wireless versus
landline competition in local markets. Finally,
25
26
27

See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 34.
See id.
See 47 C.F.R. § 90.7 (1998) (defining Basic Trading

Area).
28
See Third CMRS Competition Report, supra note 7, at
19750. See also, e.g., Comments of AT&T Wireless Service,
Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98205, at 8, n.32 (Jan. 25, 1999).
NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 2.
29
30 The Commission specifically sought comment on the
proper scope of discussion regarding the 1992 Department
ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. See id. at para. 35. See also generally, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559,
at S2 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines].
31 See 47 C.F.R. § 22.942 (1998) (forbidding CMRS licensees from holding an attributable interest in other CMRS
licensees if the ownership interest is greater than 5% or there
is an actual controlling interest of the subject CMRS provider
in a given cellular geographic statistical area ("CGSA") and
the combination threatens competition).
32
See 47 C.F.R. § 90.7 (1998) (defining SMR as a "radio
system in which licensees provide land mobile communication services in the 800 MHz to 900 MHz bands on a commercial basis to entities eligible to be licensed under this
part, Federal Government entities, and individuals.").
33 See.47 C.F.R. § 24.5 (1998) (defining PCS as "[r]adio
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this comment argues that legal constraints and
market forces independent of the spectrum cap
and the cellular cross-interest rule 3 ' provide adequate protection against anticompetitive behavior.
While initially the cap may have served a useful
purpose in ensuring that many new wireless carriers could enter the CMRS market, today the spectrum cap is discordant with the competitive purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act"). Substantial competition exists in
the CMRS market. Furthermore, technological
innovation and network buildout in the context
of convergence are causing regulatory distinctions
between-and relevant markets of-wireless services to blend together. Unless the Commission
acts decisively to remove its thumb from the scale,
cellular providers might be at a serious disadvantage to the combined competitive impact of Specialized Mobile Radio Service ("SMR"),32 Personal
Communication Service ("PCS"),

33

Local Multi-

point Distribution Service ("LMDS") ,34 Wireless
Communication Service ("WCS")

35

and Mobile

Satellite Services ("MSS").36 CMRS carriers must
be allowed to develop new advanced technologies, to compete in a world of wireless broadband
content, and increase the amount of spectrum
they can hold in order to foster competition and
allow CMRS to develop as a substitute for wireline
communications that encompass mobile and ancillary fixed
communication that provide services to individuals and businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing networks."). See also supra note 15 (defining broadband and narrowband PCS).
34
See 47 C.F.R. § 101.3 (1998) (defining LMDS as a fixed
point-to-point or point-to-multipoint radio system consisting
of a hub station that provides one or two-way communication
with microwave radio stations located at a subscriber's
premesis); See also HARvV L. ZUCKMAN ET AL. 3 MODERN COM-

142 (1999) (describing LMDS as one type
of service that can be thought of as "'wireless cable' [that]
uses microwave channels for over-the-air distribution of video
programming to individual reception antennas.").
35
See 47 C.F.R. § 27.4 (1998) (defining WCS as a "radiocommunication service that encompasses fixed, mobile, satellite [digital audio radio service], and radiolocation service.").
36
See HARVEy L. ZUCKMAN ET AL. 3 MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAw 305 (1999) (stating that "low and middle earth
orbiting satellite projects, like Iridium, Odyssey, Global-star,
and ICO, an Inmarsat spin-off company, propose to make
mobile satellite service (MSS) global and personal in scope.")
"These ventures aim to provide ubiquitous, wireless, digital
coverage to pocket-sized telephones." Id. SMR, PCS, LMDS,
WCS, and MSS are potential competing services to cellular
telephony. See generally id. [hereinafter competing wireless services].
MUNICATIONS LAW
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service. 3 7 To the extent that concerns exist that a
given carrier will amass too much spectrum and
be able to exert power in one or more geographic
areas, the Commission should rely on antitrust
laws, its own public interest review authority over
license transfers, its simultaneous/multi-round
auctions of additional wireless spectrum, and marketplace realities to check such behavior by carriers in the wireless market.
II.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE BEHIND THE
SPECTRUM CAP

A. FCC Enabling Acts
Pursuant to the deregulatory emphasis of the
Ominbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,38
the FCC established the CMRS spectrum cap in its
CMRS Third Report and Order.3 9 Before the Com-

mission adopted the spectrum cap, the Commission regulated the wireless industry by restricting
licensees' aggregation of broadband PCS spectrum through "service specific limitations." 40 The
FCC determined that if a licensee amassed
enough spectrum, it might be capable, either
alone or in combination, of engaging in exclusionary practices, limiting services offered, or detrimentally driving prices upward. 4 1 The Commis-

sion concluded that it would be able to prevent
licensees from warehousing spectrum capacity by
instituting a cap for broadband PCS, SMR, and
37 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1994) (stating that the Commission shall consider, inter alia, efficiency benefits, reduction of regulatory burdens on spectrum users and marketplace demands in deciding how to manage and allocate
spectrum).
38 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b), 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (amending the
Communications Act of 1934 and codified at 47 U.S.C.

§ 332).
39 See In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act - Regulatory Treatment of Mobile
Services, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7988, para. 7
(1994).
40
See NPRM, supra note 15, at 10. See also In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 7700, para. 61 (1993) (restricting licensees of broadband PCS spectrum to 40 MHz of the aggregate spectrum
allocated to broadband PCS). See also In re Amendment of
the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC
Rcd. 4957, para. 67 (1994) (amending the Commission's
rules to permit cellular licensees after Jan. 1, 2000, to increase their PCS spectrum holdings from 10 MHz to 15
MHz).
41
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 10.

cellular licenses. 42 In its CMRS Spectrum Cap Report
and Order, the FCC adopted a unitary 45 MHz
CMRS spectrum cap rather than retaining three
separate caps because of the relative flexibility
one cap affords providers in the face of shifting

marketplace conditions. 4 3 The FCC based its decision in favor of the CMRS spectrum cap on its
analysis of potential market concentrations calculated under the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI") method of determining market concentration. 4 4 The Commission determined that the
45 MHz spectrum cap was an essential measure to
forestall high levels of concentration and an45
ticompetitive practices in the CMRS market.
The FCC reasoned that the CMRS spectrum cap
would be in the public interest because it would
promote competition among CMRS providers,

provide a simple system of administrative oversight, and add stability and predictability to an
46
otherwise volatile market.
The FCC's latest review of the spectrum cap
47
arose out of the Commission's Biennial Review.
The relevant parts of Section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 state that the FCC must examine all of its regulations applicable to operations or activities of telecommunications
providers, ascertain whether there is material
competition between those providers and rescind
or amend regulations that are not essential to
serving the public interest. 48 Many, including the

42
43
44

See id. at para. 13.
See id. at para. 16.
See id. See also HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

458 (1994) (stating that "[t]he HHI as used in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines is the sum of the squares of every
firm in the relevant market."). "For example, if a market has
3 firms each with a market share of 25%, 1 firm of 15% and 1
firm of 10%, the HHI would be 252 + 252 + 252 + 152 + 102 =
2200. Such a market.., is considered highly concentrated
under the 1992 Guidelines, which so regard any market with
an HHI greater than 1800." Id.
45 See NPRM, supra note 15, at par. 16.
46 See id.
47 This requirement was imposed by the 1996 amendments to the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 161 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
48 See id. ("In every even-numbered year (beginning with
1998), the Commission shall review all regulations issued
under this Act in effect at the time of the review that apply to
the operations or activities of any provider of telecommunications service; and shall determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest as the result
of meaningful economic competition between providers of
such service.... The Commission shall repeal or modify any

regulation it determines to be no longer necessary in the
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Commission, have observed that Section 11 obligates the FCC to either amend or repeal the
CMRS spectrum cap when it no longer furthers
the public interest by promoting "meaningful economic competition." 49 The Commission has proposed the following regulatory options for the
CMRS spectrum cap: (1) modifying significant
overlap threshold; (2) modifying 45MHz limitation; (3) modifying ownership attribution thresholds; (4) forbearing from enforcing the CMRS
spectrum cap; (5) sunsetting the CMRS spectrum
cap; and (6) eliminating the CMRS spectrum
50
cap.
The 1993 amendments to the statutory provisions governing CMRS promote a deregulatory
environment. 5 1 Among other things, Section 332
established that the FCC may choose to forbear
from subjecting any CMRS provider to any regulation under Title 1152 if it determines that the regulation is not essential to ensuring just, reasonable
and nondiscriminatory rates and terms of service,
protection of consumers can be achieved without
reliance on the regulation, and the public interest

is served. 53 A major goal of the 1993 amendments

public interest.").
49 Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5 (Jan.
25, 1999). See generally supra note 40 (discussing old servicespecific limitations).
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 8.
50
51
See supra note 38. See also generally H.R. CONF. REP. No.
103-213 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1162.
52 Other than Sections 201, 202, 208. See 47 U.S.C.
332(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
53
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (1994 & Supp. 111996). Section
332(c) provides that the FCC may forbear from enforcing a
regulation when:
(i) enforcement of such provision is not necessary in order to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications,
or regulations for or in connection with that service are
just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory; (ii) enforcement of such provision is not
necessary for the protection of consumers; and (iii)
specifying such provision is consistent with the public interest.
Id.
54
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1183 (asserting the objective of
guaranteeing that "consistent with the public interest, similar
services are accorded similar regulatory treatment.")
55
In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
7988, para. 23 (1994).
56 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1994). Section 310(d) grants the
Commission significant discretion in issuing licenses:
No construction permit or station license, or any rights
thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned or disposed of
in any manner, voluntary or involuntary, directly or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any person except upon

application to the Commission and upon finding by the
Commission that the public interest, convenience and
necessity will be served thereby.
Id. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 161(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)
(requiring the Commission to "repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer necessary in the public
interest."); 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)
(obligating the Commission to "consider whether the proposed regulation ... will promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which such regulation (or
amendment) will enhance competition among providers of
commercial mobile services."); 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994 &
Supp. 11 1996) ("It shall be the policy of the United States to
encourage the provision of new technologies and services to
the public."). The Commission's public interest review is not
limited to traditional antitrust analysis:
[T]he public interest analysis... is much broader than
the traditional antitrust analysis. Competition used to
be one element the FCC considered when it evaluated
whether the public interest concerns would be met in a
telecommunications merger. Competitive concerns now
dominate the public interest analysis the Commission
conducts when approving a telecommunications
merger. The Commission, with a push from Capitol
Hill, has found that it is not enough for the public interest to lie merely in not allowing a decrease in competition, but in actually promoting competition in the communications sector. The public interest standard allows
the FCC the flexibility of imposing narrowly tailored
conditions on telecommunications mergers to further
specific policy goals.
Jason E. Friedrich, Comment, Thinkable Mergers: The FCC's
Evolving PublicInterest Standard, 6 COMMLAw CONSPECTUs 261,
274 (1998).
See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications In57
dustry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT

to Section 332 was regulatory symmetry between
similar services. 54 In its docket implementing Section 332, the FCC recognized the deregulatory
purpose of the amendments, stating that "[t]he
broad goal of this action is to ensure that economic forces - not disparate regulatory burdens shape the development of the CMRS marketplace."55

Furthermore, the emphasis of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on minimum necessary regulation is reflected in Section 310(d), which provides that transfers, assignments or any other
change in the disposition of a construction permit
or station license may not occur except where the
Commission finds that it serves the public interest, convenience and necessity. 56 Once the FCC
has found that an applicant has satisfied its burden of proving that the transfer of control of a
cellular, broadband PCS or SMR license is in the
public interest, Section 310 imposes a duty on the
Commission to approve the transfer.5

7

Thus, the

Commission not only is empowered, but also is
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obligated to assess market issues raised by transfers of control on, a case-by-case basis. 58 Even
without a spectrum cap, therefore, the FCC possesses the tools to prevent undue concentration of
wireless spectrum.

B.

59

Antitrust Statutes

. Antitrust laws also serve as a powerful check on
undue concentration and the exercise of market
power in the wireless industry. Proposed mergers
and acquisitions are subject to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which empowers the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to determine the competitive effects
of such transactions. 60 The FCC has concurrent
authority to enforce Section 7.61 In addition, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act empower the
antitrust agencies and private parties to police
contracts in restraint of trade, 62 monopoly practices 63 or attempts to monopolize. 64 Under the
Dkt. No. 98-205, at 23 (Jan. 25, 1999).
58
See id. See also NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 5 ("[W]e
wish to ensure that our regulation promotes, rather than impedes, the introduction of innovative services and technological advances.")
59
See supra Section I. To the extent that concerns exist
that a given carrier will amass too much spectrum and be
able to exert power in one or more geographic areas, the
Commission should rely on antitrust laws, its own public interest review authority over license transfers, its simultaneous/multi-round auctions of additional wireless spectrum
and marketplace realities to check such beh-lsvior by carriers
in the wireless market.
60
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). The statute states:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another person engaged also in commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisitionmay
be substantiallyto lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of
such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or
grantingof proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id. (emphasis added).
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Granting FCC the authority to enforce the Clayton Act where applicable to "common carriers

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976,65 which establishes premerger notification
procedures with certain limited exceptions, transacting parties are required to notify the Federal
Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney
General of transfers: (1) that affect interstate
commerce; (2) in which the parties have annual
sales or assets of at least $100 million and $10 million, respectively; or (3) where the acquiring entity would obtain total voting securities or assets
valued at greater than $15 million or voting control of the entity acquired that is greater than or
equal to 15% of all voting stock.66 Additionally,
the Federal Trade Commission possesses independent power to prevent anticompetitive con67
duct through assessment of civil penalties.
C. Judicial Constraint of FCC Authority
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia strictly enforced the spectrum
engaged in wire or radio communications or radio transmission of energy.").
62
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The statute
provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
63
See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The statute establishes that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
Id.
64

See id.

15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994) ("[N]o person shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of any
other person, unless both persons (or in the case of a tender
offer, the acquiring person) file notification pursuant to
rules under.., this section and the waiting period described
[in this section].").
65

66

See id.

67

See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).

[Vol. 7

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

cap to preclude BellSouth from providing certain
data services. 68 However, the same court has consistently held that where the factual predicate for
regulation no longer exists, the FCC is without au69
thority to retain the regulation. In Geller v. FCC,
the court stated that an agency cannot avoid reexamining the rationale for specific regulations
when circumstances have changed. 70 In that case,
Geller filed a petition for rulemaking after a copyright infringement consensus agreement reached
by interested parties had attained all of the objectives of the agreement. 71 The court held that the
regulatory regime based on the consensus agreement "lacked a nexus with the public interest
once the sought-after revision of the copyright
73
laws was accomplished." 72 In Meredith v. FCC,

the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a Commission decision because the FCC had "largely undermined the legitimacy of its own rule" 74 by eliminating the rationale for its policies in a formal
report. The same court in Bechtel v. FCC 5 rejected the Commission's argument that it is not
required to account for its adherence to an established policy and must only explain deviations
from settled policy or prior precedent.7

6

The

court opined that it is not enough to provide a
reasonable basis for a regulation; the Commission
has a duty to reevaluate a policy when the fact or
77
law underlying the rule has changed.
D.

The Cellular Cross-Interest Rule

Section 22.942 of the Commission's rules forbids CMRS licensees from holding an attributable
interest in other CMRS licensees in a given CGSA
if the interest threatens competition. 78 An attribSee Bell South v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
69 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Cincinnati Bell
Telephone v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 768 (6th Cir. 1995) (ordering the FCC to explain why it retained Rule 22.903, which
required Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") to provide cellular service through a separate subsidiary after ruling that a
68

BOC did not have to use a separate subsidiary to provide PCS
service).
70

71
72

73

Geller, 610 F.2d at 979.
See id.
Id.
809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

utable interest of more than 5 percent or a controlling interest in such a company subjects the
CMRS provider to the cross interest rule. 79 Like

the cap itself, the cross-interest rule was implemented to ensure competition and encourage innovation in wireless markets.8 0
E.

Standards, Proposals and Appropriate
Commission Action

The Commission has established standards it
uses when evaluating the efficacy of existing regulations. 81 First, the Commission favors market
forces over regulation as a means of serving the
public interest.8 2 Second, the FCC seeks to promote dynamic rivalry in all telecommunications
markets, specifically attempting to guarantee that
no regulatory roadblocks inhibit the development
of wireless carriers as effective competitors to local
wireline carriers.8 3 Finally, the Commission en-

deavors to ensure that all Americans enjoy the advantages of modern telecommunications services,
especially wireless services. 8 4 Generally, the Commission performs its competitive analysis of markets by determining market concentration, which
is usually gauged by market share. 85 Market share
may be measured by capacity, production or sales
information. 86

The

sion... has been removed."') (citing WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,656
F.2d 807, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
78 See 47 C.F.R. § 22.942 (1998).
79
80

See id.

82

See id.

83

See id.

84

See id.

See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 80 (stating that the
cross-interest rule was promulgated to "guarantee the competitive nature of the cellular industry and to foster the development of competing systems.") (citations omitted).
81 See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 5

85

75

957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

86

See id. at para. 33.
See id.

87

See id.

See id. at 881.

See, e.g., id. ("In the rulemaking context, for example,

it is settled law that an agency may be forced to reexamine its
approach 'if a significant factual predicate of a prior deci-

the

ance on the HHI, the FCC has acknowledged that
its regulation of CMRS must "ensure that the marketplace-and not the regulatory arena-shapes
the development and delivery of mobile services."88

Id. at 873.

77

utilized

of assessing CMRS market share.8 7 Despite its reli-

74
76

Commission

Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices ("HHI") to measure spectrum allotments as a surrogate method

In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
7988, 8002 (1994).
88
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The Commission's congressional and regulatory mandate demonstrates that the Commission
must adopt the least restrictive regulations necessary to achieve its administrative objectives. 89
Case law in the District of Columbia Circuit,
which has primary jurisdiction over appeals of
FCC decisions, 90 requires the FCC to abandon
outmoded regulations. 9 1 In light of prior law, existing regulatory regimes and changes in market
conditions, it is appropriate for the Commission
to remove the spectrum cap and thereby promote
competition in the CMRS marketplace.
III.

RETAINING THE SPECTRUM
AGGREGATION LIMITATION:
UNJUSTIFIED AND BURDENSOME
REGULATION

A. Proper Measurement of Market Capacity
and Concentration
In assessing the efficacy of the CMRS spectrum
cap, it is essential to determine the appropriate
weight to attach to market concentration vis-a-vis
its HHI calculations. 92 In assessing whether to re89

See supra notes 55 - 59 and accompanying text.
See 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (stating
that appeals of Commission orders and decisions may be
made to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia).
91 See supra notes 68 - 77 and accompanying text.
92
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 35.
93 See id. (noting that market capacity may be measured
in 'terms of assigned spectrum, operational spectrum, subscribers, revenue, or traffic/minutes of use).
94
See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5 (Jan. 25,
1999) (arguing that the Commission should include in the
relevant market definition "those services that are competitive with, or are readily substitutable for, traditional wireless
service). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST

tain, repeal or modify the cap, the Commission
seeks to determine the relevant market and the
appropriate measure of market share.9 3 The appropriate measure of market capacity is the
amount of total spectrum assigned to a carrier.
Other measures of market share distort competitive realities by not accounting for fluid market
94
penetration rates and potential competition.
The amount of spectrum allocated to each CMRS
carrier is a better measure of market share because it does not rely on "slippery" data like subscribership or minutes, which are subject to sudden and significant variations.9 5 Moreover, given
the Commission's acknowledgment that the 1992
Merger Guidelines include uncommitted entrants
in market competition analysis of relevant markets, the market concentration and competition
analysis should be expanded to include potential
competitors because of their positive competitive
effect on pricing in the relevant market.9 6
In determining the appropriate market definition, the FCC should include competitive services 97 that rival or are substitutes for conventional
mobile radio, or cellular, service. 98 The Commis-

POLICY, THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 508-15

analysis that has .no relationship to the ultimate depiction of a market. For instance, a given PCS carrier may
have only 2% of the wireless customers in a given market
due to the fact it is a new entrant, but through aggressive
marketing, that number could climb to 20% or even
higher within a very short period of time. But whether
this carrier has 2% or 20% or more of the customers in
an area, it always retains a 30 MHz block of spectrum
under its control and that spectrum is unavailable to
other users.
Id.
96 See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 36 ("[S]hould [the
Commission] limit [its] assessment of market participants to
only current suppliers and any other firms that have announced intentions to commence operations, declared their
intentions to offer the relevant product, and will imminently
begin soliciting business?"). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

(1994) (discussing potential competition, perceived poten-

FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND

tial competition and "actual" potential competition and the

ITS PRAcTICE 477 (1994) ("The Guidelines include in the
market firms that can easily and economically shift to manufacturing the relevant product, or that can easily begin shipment of an existing competitive product into the relevant geographic market. The Guidelines refer to such firms as
"uncommitted" entrants - that is, firms that can move into
competition with the merging firms with relatively little risk
or costly redeployment of resources.").
97
See supra note 36.
98 See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5 (Jan. 25,
1999). See also Wireless Telecommunications Action - FCC
Adopts Third Annual Report to Congress On State of CMRS
Competition (WT Dkt. No. 98-13), FCC NEWS, May 14, 1998
at 1, available at <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Reports/fcc98091.pdf> (visited Feb. 9, 1999). The Commission

90

effect of each on prices and competition). PCS providers, for
example, arguably are perceived potential entrants because
their presence has reduced prices not only in markets they
have entered, but also in all CMRS markets as cellular entrants operate more competitively in order to make themselves more attractive. See id. See also supra notes 9 -10.
95
See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6 (Jan. 25,
1999). The benefits of using spectrum allocation as a measure of market conditions outweigh using subscribers or minutes because of volatility and unpredictability in subscribership or minutes of usage as a result of increasingly
competitive market conditions. In this regard, SBC notes:
To measure more contingent barometers such as subscribers or minutes of use could result in a snapshot
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sion should recognize that, while various CMRS
services have distinct transmission and network
configurations, from both marketing and consumer perspectives these services directly compete
with each other for subscribers. 99 More to the
point, while cellular providers arguably offer a distinctive service, they are under intense competitive pressure from substitute services 00 that offer
price, use and quality that are interchangeable
with cellular service. 10 1
To properly assess relevant geographic markets,
it is necessary to recognize that the Commission's
rules delineating service areas take into consideration that there are disparate market area defini-

tions among CMRS services.10 2 For example, PCS
and cellular service area maps define their respective service areas based on different geographic,
demographic and statistical assumptions.10 3 -So
while each of these wireless services is subject to
the spectrum cap, they are not subject to the cap
in the same areas. Also, while PCS applies a different service area definition than cellular, PCS
MTAs and BTAs frequently overlap multiple cellular MSA and RSA markets.1 0 4 Furthermore, many
wireless carriers are marketing "nationwide seamless service" by combining their licensed areas
with advantageous roaming contracts.10 5 From a
consumer's point-of-view, however, whether the

has found that new entrants and digital services are driving
down prices and providing an array of service options:
In the past year, the mobile telephony market has
achieved new highs in subscribership - with 55 million
subscribers representing 20 percent of the nation's population subscribing to service at the end of 1997. This
represents an increase of over 11 million new subscribers during 1997. The Third Report finds that mobile telephony is an important engine of economic growth in
the CMRS marketplace. According to the report, the
most dramatic development in mobile telephony has
been the entry of new broadband Personal Communications Services (PCS) and digital Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) providers into most major markets across the
country. As a result of these new entrants, prices have
been falling and service offerings have become more diverse.

some portion of, the same pool of customers.").

Id See also The Council of Economic Advisors, Progress Report: Growth and Competition in U.S. Telecommunications
1993 - 1998 at 15, Feb. 8, 1999, available at <http://www.fcc.
gov> (visited Feb. 9, 1999) (observing that the "main wireless
telephone technologies [are] cellular, PCS, and ESMR" and
that "wireless communications encompass such services as
paging, SMR, and fixed point-to-point, as well as such new
services as fixed wireless local loop and Third Generation
mobile services.").
99 See Third CMRS Competition Report, supra note 7, at
19762. The Commission has noted the fungible nature of
these different services:
[T]he mobile telephone market is defined as all operators who offer commercially available interconnected
mobile phone services. These operators provide access
to the public switched network... via mobile communication devices that employ radiowave technology to
transmit their calls. Currently, this market is dominated
by providers using three different types of FCC licenses:
cellular radiotelephone, broadband PCS, and SMR services. While all three of these FCC services were created at different times and with different intentions, they each now offer mobile telephone services that arefundamentally interchangeable.
Furthermore, while providers use different marketing techniques
and different technologies to differentiate themselves to the public, they are all offering essentially the same product, mobile telephone services.
Id (emphasis added). See also Comments of SBC Wireless,
Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98205, at 5 (Jan. 25, 1999) ("These services compete for all, or

100

See id.

See id. See also United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) (stating that the
test of whether products or services are fungible is whether
the "market is composed of products that have reasonable
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced - price, use and qualities considered."). Churn rates
would seem to strengthen the proposition that a slight decrease in SMR prices, for example, would result in significant
customer migration from cellular services to SMR. See In re
Cellular telecommunications Industry Association's Petition
for Forbearance from Commercial Mobile Radio Services
Number Portability Obligations, WT Dkt. No. 98-229, and
Telephone Number Portability, CC Dkt. No. 95-116, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1999 WL 58618 (rel. Feb. 9, 1999)
(defining churn as a high frequency of changing wireless carriers). See also supra note 98; High Chum Again Dogs Powertel,
COMM. TODAY, Oct. 30, 1998 available at 1998 WL 17661574
(4.5% monthly churn rate); Slow-Growing Wireless is Stable Financial Contributorfor Centurytel, WiRELEss TODAY, Oct. 27,
1998 available at 1998 WL 9345280 (2.3% monthly churn);
Microcell's End-of-September Base Hits 180,000 Mark, COMM. ToDAY, October 19, 1998 available at 1998 WL 17661424 (2.8%
monthly rate); High-MOU Individuals, Men Seen as More Prone
to Chum, WIRELEss TODAY, Sept. 3, 1998 availableat 1998 WL
9344840 (10% of survey respondents changed carriers in previous year); Lack of Loyalty Can Hurt: Study Pegs U.S. Wireless
Chum Potential at 38 percent, PCS WEEK, Aug. 26, 1998 available at 1998 WL 8016013.
102
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
103 See id.
104
See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5-6 (Jan. 25,
1999). See also NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 35 (inquiring
about relevant product and geographic markets).
105
See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5 (Jan. 25,
1999). See also Speech of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard,
Address to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Convention, New Orleans, Louisiana (Feb. 9, 1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek906.html>
("Consolidation and alliances are creating a national footprint. A footprint that is creating a path to more convenience and lower prices for all Americans."); In re Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial
Mobile Radio Services, Second Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 10
101
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service is facilities-based or contractual in nature

CMRS providers would underscore the Commis-

is an irrelevant distinction. These nationwide
roaming contracts, therefore, further blur market
area definitions by in effect expanding the geographic market area of the subscriber. Thus, the
Commission's definition of the relevant market
suffers from comparisons of services with distinct
demographic/geographic characteristics, and
powerful market forces that transcend the constraints of a designated service area.10 6 Current
HHI calculations of market concentration are distorted because the Commission does not account
for disparate market area definitions.
Removing the spectrum cap will help alleviate
the extreme burdens of regulatory compliance to
which CMRS providers currently are subjected.
The overlapping nature of CMRS market boundaries makes it difficult for CMRS providers to comply with a spectrum cap because wireless providers
have to evaluate every MSA, MTA, RSA or BTA in
which they provide service to ensure they do not
run afoul of the artificial restriction in any single
area.1 0 7 Merely raising the cap rather than removing it will perpetuate this problem. Moreover,
continuing to impose this additional burden on

sion's abdication of its regulatory duty to engage
in proactive assessment.10
In addition to properly defining the appropriate geographic market, the Commission's reliance
upon HHI calculations is an undesirably rigid
method of determining market power. 109 It is

FCC Rcd. 10666, para. 45 (April 20, 1995) ("'Roaming describes the situation which occurs when the subscriber of one
CMRS provider enters the service area of another CMRS provider with whom the subscriber has no pre-existing service or
financial relationship, and attempts either to continue an inprogress call, to receive an in-coming call or to place an outgoing call.").
106 See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5 (Jan. 25,

merger guidelines reject "automatic prohibitions based on
market share in favor of case-by-case analysis that requires the
examination of other factors to determine whether a given
level of concentration is likely to produce anticompetitive effects."). The case-by-case analysis of the merger guidelines
"avoids the distinct possibility that an automatic cutoff would
prevent mergers that have substantial benefits." Id. See also
1992 Merger Guidelines at § 0.1 ("While challenging competitively harmful mergers, the Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers that
are either competitively beneficial or neutral.").

1999).
107
See Comments of BellSouth Corporation to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 20 (Jan. 25,
1999).

108

See generally supra notes 48 - 49, 51, 68 - 77. See also

NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 5; In re Petition of the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control to Retain Regulatory Control of the Rates of Wholesale Cellular Service Providers in the State of Connecticut, Report and Order, 10 FCC
Rcd. 7025 paras. 8, 10 (1995). The Commission has observed
that:
OBRA reflects a general preference in favor of reliance
on market forces rather than regulation. Section
332(c), for example, empowers the Commission to reduce CMRS regulation, and it places on us the burden of
demonstrating that continued regulation will promote competitive market conditions....

Congress delineated its prefer-

ence for allowing this emerging market to develop subject
to only as much regulationfor which the Commission and the
states could demonstrate a clear cut need.
Id. (emphasis added).
109 See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6 (Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that the

necessary to measure the market in terms of spectrum allocation rather than minutes or customers
in order to avoid distorted results.' 10 It also is essential to recognize that the HHI calculation has
limited application regardless of the measure of
market concentration used. 11 ' Traditional antitrust analysis is based on the assumption that one
entity is not deemed to possess even a theoretical
ability to capitalize on its ability to raise prices unilaterally without first attaining a sufficient level of
market power. 112 Even if there are other significant factors indicating the existence of market
power, the 1992 Merger Guidelines set 35 percent
market share as the threshold level for the existence of market power. 113 Under the current
CMRS spectrum cap of 45 MHz, a carrier is restricted to an equivalent 25% percent of market

110

See supra note 95.

111 See 1992 Merger Guidelines at § 0 (stating that judgment must be applied when analyzing mergers under antitrust laws, despite the fact the increased predictability that
the Guidelines should afford.) "Because the specific standards set forth in the Guidelines must be applied to a broad
range of possible factual circumstances, mechanical application of those standards may provide misleading answers to
the economic questions raised under the antitrust laws." Id.
112
See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAw HANDBOOK
583 (1998) ("[A] 'hypothetical monopolist' [is one who]
could profitably impose a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price without pulling in additional substitute products .... [a] 5 percent increase over a period of

one year is given as a fair benchmark for most purposes.").
See also Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT
Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6 (Jan. 25, 1999).
113
See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6 (Jan. 25, 1999). See also 1992
Merger Guidelines at § 2.22.
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share,' 1 4 a level substantially below the 35 percent
necessary to establish that undue market power
exists. 115 In this regard, the 45 MHz cap is overbroad; the focus on sheer quantitative measures
of competition through HHI calculations has the
effect of proscribing consolidations that may have
6
desirable market efficiencies."
The Commission's reliance on numerical competition 1 7 is also questionable because market
concentration alone does not accurately represent market power." 8 Rather than primarily relying on an HHI calculation, the Commission
should incorporate, on a case-by-case basis, factors
such as efficiency into its market power analysis,
similar to the federal antitrust enforcement agencies. 1 9 Federal antitrust policy recognizes that
the crucial issue is not whether there is attrition of
competitors in a market because there is no magical, predetermined number of competitors in
wireless or any line of business.' 20 To the contrary, federal antitrust policy relies on free markets and narrowly tailored protections against
114
The total amount of spectrum allocated to CMRS is
180 MHz. This renders the 45 MHz of spectrum roughly
equivalent to 25% of market share using the HHI calculation.
115, See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6 (Jan. 25, 1999).
116
See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK
583 (1998) (noting that efficiency considerations are expressly acknowledged and approved under the Guidelines as
a potential part of the case selection analysis.). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAw OF

ITs PRACTICE 455 (1994) (observing that
while the 1992 Merger guidelines placed the burden on the
merging parties to demonstrate mitigating efficiencies, the
standard of proof was relaxed substantially and "qualifying
efficiencies include, but are not limited to, achieving economies of scale, better integration of production facilities, plant
specialization, lower transportation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of merging firms.").
117
The Commission has used the term "numerical" in
the broadcast context when it has sought to resolve issues of
scarcity. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council
against Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (Rel. Aug. 6,
1987).
COMPETITION AND

118

See supra note 109.

119 See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6 (Jan. 25, 1999). Ironically, the
Commission, in other areas, explicitly employs a public interest standard that is much broader than the antitrust review
conducted by the Department of Justice. SeeJason E. Friedrich, Comment, Thinkable Mergers: The FCC's Evolving Public
Interest Standard, 6 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 261, 275 (1998)
(noting that while the 1996 Telecommunications Act

market failure.
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This policy should be applied

to CMRS. An artificial approach based on quantitative, rather than qualitative, analysis does an injustice to the dynamic wireless industry and subjects the Commission to criticism that its
22
standards are arbitrary and capricious.'
B.

Meaningful Competition Renders the
Spectrum Cap Unnecessary

Market forces underscore the unnecessary nature of a CMRS spectrum cap that has served its
function of promoting competition in the short
term.' 23 The spectrum cap should be lifted because there has been a sharp growth in competition in the CMRS industry. 24 The industry is
marked by rapid competitive growth, a lack of
market concentration and prices that are falling
swiftly. 125 Industry participants have argued that
market forces render predatory behavior by
CMRS providers economically prohibitive. 26 The
competitive environment in the wireless market,
prompted the Commission to make competition a primary
factor for evaluation of a merger, it is not the sole criterion).
120 Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 9 (Jan. 25,
1999). See also WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAw HANDBOOK 582 (1998) ("[Analysis of] statistical and non-statistical
factors as an integrated whole, reflect[s] the underlying purpose of the [1992 Merger Guidelines] as .. .case assessment
and selection criteria . . .

[a]ll relevant information will,

thus, be considered, and the agencies will not select .. .
case[s] for prosecution simply because the prima facie statistics look good.").
121
See supra notes 109 and 111.
122
See supra notes 55-59, 68-77. See also United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); Comments of
the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 21
(Jan. 25, 1999).
123
See Reply Comments of GTE, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 5 (Feb. 10, 1999)
(observing that some of the most noteworthy developments
include an almost quadrupling of spectrum allocated to
CMRS, issuance of six new PCS licenses in each market, the
advent of carriers with pricing plans that are national in
scope, and consistent CMRS price decreases.)
124

See id.

See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 17-18
(Jan. 25, 1999) (observing that the entrance of PCS providers
into the CMRS market has reduced cellular carriers' profit
margins by forcing them to reduce their prices).
126
Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at (i)
(Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that it is unlikely that a CMRS carrier
would engage in preclusive warehousing of spectrum as a
predation strategy because the "costs of acquiring spectrum
in the marketplace for anticompetitive purposes are prohibi125
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and sharply increasing consumer demand for
wireless services, provides evidence that the wireless industry is not particularly vulnerable to one
or more entities gaining market power, whether
12 7
through collusion or exclusionary practices.
Multiple well-financed actual competitors and potential entrants are attracted to the wireless markets because they annually have witnessed the dra128
matic rise of consumer demand for CMRS.
The Commission's Third CMRS Competition Report
recounted that, as of June 1998, there were three
or more CMRS competitors in approximately 273
BTAs 129 covering 87 percent of the nation's total
population, at least four CMRS competitors were
offering service in 71 of these BTAs, 51 BTAs had
13 0
five providers, and 13 BTAs had six providers.
In addition, as of October 1998, at least four U.S.
market areas had seven broadband CMRS provid13 1
ers operating within their borders.
In light of such robust competition, CMRS carriers are concentrating capital to build out existing networks, shifting to digital technology and
13 2
investing in nascent, advanced capabilities.
Moreover, declining prices are squeezing profit
margins, thereby forcing CMRS providers to cut
costs to remain competitive. 13 3 As CMRS carriers

panding their customer base and maintaining
current customers, they will possess relatively few
resources to devote to a predatory scheme of reducing competition through warehousing of spectrum. 13 4 Moreover, churn rates'

35

are significant,

as customers frequently switch wireless carriers. 136
While there is a credible argument from a consumer's point-of-view that limiting the amount of
spectrum a carrier can use could lead to a wider
variety of products and services in the relevant
"output" market, there is no available evidence to
suggest that
limiting "input" results in increased
1 7
"output. 13
That is, it does not necessarily follow
that restricting spectrum allocation will increase
the number of competitors and encourage deployment of new services, especially if deployment
might mean exceeding the cap.' 38 Competition
among CMRS carriers, increasing consumer demand and significant churn rates, tighter profit
margins and falling prices lead inexorably to the
conclusion that the market will discipline any attempt to exercise market power. Finally; the
Commission's repeal of rules where it has found
such competitive conditions bolsters the argument that it should remove the CMRS spectrum
39
cap regulatory regime. 1

direct efforts toward maximizing efficiency, extive."). See also Reply Comments of GTE Inc., to the Notice of
ProposedRulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 10-15 (Feb. 10,
1999) (citing the following as structural factors rendering the
CMRS market resistant to anticompetitive conduct: national

Treatment of Mobile Services, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC
Rcd. 7988 (1994) [hereinafter Third Report and Order]. See
also Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, Figure 2

providers and pricing plans; difficulty of dominating the market for both spectrum and equipment; limited spectrum requirements for effective competition; declining entry barriers; spectrum's durability; and the prohibitive costs of
warehousing).
127
See supra notes 6-10, 20-28, 32-36. See also, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §13(b) (1994). Section 13(b) provides that:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in
price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section. . . . [p]rovided, however, that
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting

(Jan. 25, 1999).
130
See Third Report and Order,supranote 129, at n.196. See

the primafacie case thus made by showing that his lower price
or thefurnishingof services orfacilities to any purchaseror purchasers was made in goodfaith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
Id. (emphasis added).
128
See Comments of AT&T Wireless Service, Inc., to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 8-9
Uan. 25, 1999).

also Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6-7 (Jan.
25, 1999).
131
See Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6-7
(Jan.25, 1999).
132

See id. at 12-13.

133

See supra notes 125 - 131.

134

See Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to

the Notice of ProposedRulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 1213 (Jan. 25, 1999) ("There is little room for carriers to absorb

additional expenses, particularly those of the magnitude in-

Rand McNally determines the number of BTAs

volved in acquiring enough spectrum to reduce competition
in the market [through warehousing] to the point where excessive returns are possible.").
135
See supra note 101 (defining and discussing churn
rates).
136 See id.
137
See Comments of AT&T Wireless Service, Inc., to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 8-9
(Jan. 25, 1999).
138 See id.

(493), as well as MTAs (51). See In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act - Regulatory

139 See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 9 Uan.

129
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IV.

UNCAPPING COMPETITION:
REMOVING THE SPECTRUM
AGGREGATION LIMITATION

A.

Efficiency Benefits: Accommodating
Consumer Needs and Competition in the
Local Loop and Regulatory Parity

In light of the robustly competitive CMRS marketplace, the question arises as to whether the
wireless industry is able to satisfy consumer demand. Anticipating this issue, the Commission
has acknowledged that development of new technologies might engender situations that bolster a
finding that removing the spectrum aggregation
limitation is in the public interest. 140 Concomitantly, the Commission has addressed the related
issue of whether market efficiency ameliorates any
anticompetitive effects of removing the CMRS

spectrum cap, suggesting that lifting the cap
could accelerate the introduction of third generation wireless services that otherwise might be precluded.1 4 ' Moreover, the Commission has intimated that lifting the cap might create a
regulatory environment conducive to entry by
fixed wireless providers, expanding the pool of

potential carriers of last resort and, thus, promoting universal service 142
There are significant public interest benefits
In re Policy and Rules Concerning the
25, 1999); see also, e.g.,
Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20730, para.21 (1996) (removing tariff reporting requirements for interexchange carriers after finding that "market forces" will "generally ensure" just and
reasonable rates and practices); In re Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc., 12 FCC Rcd. 8596 (1997) (eliminating other
tariff obligations based on finding that competition effectively disciplines anti-competitive conduct).
140
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 42. The Commission's anticipation of arguments that lifting the cap might allow CMRS providers to attain economies of scale lends
credence to that view that such removing the cap will lead to
deployment of new technologies and services and thereby
serve the public interest:
With respect to economies of scope, we envision several
scenarios that might support arguments for relaxing
spectrum aggregation limitations to accommodate consumer needs. We anticipate that arguments will be
made that wireless providers could offer additional service of significant value to the public (e.g., high-speed
mobile data services) by acquiring spectrum in excess of
our current 45 MHz limit, and that such flexibility would
therefore be in the public interest. Specifically, we anticipate the argument that if they were not subject to the
cap, existing providers would be able to furnish new
services at lower cost relative to new entrants because incumbents can capitalize on existing facilities (e.g., towers) or other assets (e.g., brand name recognition, estab-

that would counterbalance virtually all potential
anticompetitive effects emanating from concentrated ownership. It is probable that a CMRS provider can provide more and advanced services if it
possesses additional spectrum to allocate to the
service and interference buffer zones most efficiently. 143 In this regard, the spectrum cap not
only restricts beneficial mergers that are desirable
under HHI analysis, but also restricts non-merging entities from attaining economies of scale that
would allow them to introduce new technologies
and services. In fact, the reason why the Commission first imposed limitations on the number of
cellular licenses was because it recognized the potential anticompetitive effect of attaining economies of scale. 144 Now, however, such limitations
do more to prevent competition and raise
costs.' 45 Retaining the spectrum cap likely would
result in significant market inefficiencies that may
deprive consumers of additional wireless services. 146
Conversely, lifting the spectrum cap would result in market efficiencies and promote the development of new technologies and services by
CMRS providers.

147

Removing the spectrum cap

will not reduce the FCC's ability to achieve its policy of ensuring that meaningful competition exists
in the CMRS market. 1 48 However, removing the
lished customer base).
Id.
See id.
141
See id. at para. 43 (asking whether a "relaxed" cap
142
might allow "efficient deployment" of wireless services that
otherwise "would be prevented under the present cap," including: third generation wireless services; fixed wireless services, perhaps under a universal service regime; and delivery
of wireless services to under-served areas). The Commission
also raised the possibility that "an enforceable commitment
to provide such service in high-cost or low-income areas
[might] override anticompetitive concerns." Id.
143
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 41 (noting that increased spectrum allotments permit carriers to rely less on
spectrum reuse and allow greater distance between tower facilities). See also generally 47 C.F.R. § 2.102(f) (1998) ("The
stations of a service shall use frequencies so separated from
the limits of a band allocated to that service as not to cause
harmful interference to allocated services in immediately adjoining frequency bands.").
144
Comments of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 6-7 (Jan.
25, 1999).
145
146

Id.

See supra notes 111 - 116.
See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 15 - 17 (Jan. 25, 1999).
See id. See also supra notes 78 - 85 and accompanying
148
147
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cap will: (1) afford providers greater responsiveness to consumer demand; (2) assure the roll-out
of advanced technologies and introduction of innovative services; and (3) permit CMRS providers
to assume a competitive posture that may enable
them to more easily offer alternative service in the
local loop. 149 The Commission has implicitly confirmed the significant benefits of removing the
spectrum cap by expressing its concern that the
cap may be an obstacle to the development and
deployment of various wireless service options
such as third generation high-speed mobile data
150
transmission and wireless local service.
It is axiomatic that the development of new
technologies directly corresponds to the amount
invested in research. 1 51 New technologies and
services are spectrum intensive. 152 The spectrum
cap creates a disincentive to investing in many of
the technologies that the Commission itself has
identified as desirable because it would be technologically infeasible and economically prohibitive
to introduce such technologies in a market subject to an artificial cap. While research and development is key to most industries, it is especially
important in the wireless industry because technological development-as a response to increased
competition-is the impetus for declining prices,
new and reliable service and advanced functionalities. 153 There is little incentive for a CMRS protext.

See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 20 (Jan. 25, 1999).
150 See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 48 (stating that the
Commission "share [s] the concerns expressed by CTIA about
any possible impediments that may be imposed by the spectrum cap on the plans of CMRS providers to expand the array of wireless services that they will be able to offer."). Moreover, the Commission observes that "some wireless carriers
are examining technical options related to third-generation
wireless networks that may provide a platform for delivering
high-speed mobile data services" and that "[o]ther companies are contemplating the use of wireless spectrum to offer
local exchange services." Id.
149

151 See generally RIcHARD EELS & CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BusINEss 341 ("Research and devel-

opment, with its consequent innovation, may be regarded as
the modern form of competition.").
152
See Comments of BellSouth Corporation to the Notice
of ProposedRulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 10 (Jan. 25,
1999) (stating that new third generation services account for
200 MHz out of the 390 MHz allocated for existing wireless
and new terrestrial third generation services in the latest
global spectrum requirement).
153
See Comments of AT&T Wireless Service, Inc., to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 12
(Jan. 25, 1999).

vider to invest in new technologies because research dollars are not recoverable in markets
subject to the CMRS spectrum cap.1

54

By lifting

the spectrum cap the FCC would create incentives
for greater investment in new wireless technologies.
What are these new technologies and under
what circumstances would they be available to
consumers? Third generation wireless service is
an international standard being developed by the
International Telecommunications Union that
will introduce mobile data and multimedia applications. 155 Retaining the spectrum cap would prevent CMRS carriers from obtaining the large
quantities of spectrum required to market third
generation services successfully.1 56 Given the significant increase in spectrum that will have to be
allocated to CMRS if third generation services are
going to be introduced, 57 the ability of a carrier
to exercise market power will be significantly diminished, rendering fears of market concentration unfounded. The public interest would be
served because consumers would benefit from
new technologies, which the FCC by statute must
8

promote. 15

Lifting the spectrum cap likewise will promote
the public interest by unleashing competition in
local markets. While mobile voice can be offered
over as little as 10 MHz of bandwidth, 159 provision
154
See id. at 7 (stating that where firms are already operating at or near the spectrum cap there is diminished incentive to develop new technologies, lower prices or improve
quality). There would be little economic incentive to research new technologies that might augment regional or national services if deployment of those technologies would
cause the carrier to exceed the cap in the relevant geographic areas. See id.
155
See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Inquiry, 13 FCC Rcd.
15280, para. 49 (rel. Aug. 7, 1998).
156
See Comments of BellSouth Corporation to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 10 (Jan. 25,
1999) ("For existing carriers, the 45 MHz cap would effectively foreclose them from having access to the substantial
amounts of new spectrum needed to offer new third generation services, including multimedia, internet access, imaging,
and videoconferencing.").
157
See supra notes 143, 146.
158
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 157 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (stating that it is the policy of the United States to encourage introduction of new technologies and providing deadlines for
Commission approval or disapproval of technology deployment).
159
See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the No-
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of additional services like high-speed internet and
two-way data services' 6° currently is not feasible
because of the amounts of spectrum in excess of
the cap that are required. 16 1 The spectrum cap
discourages CMRS providers from expanding
their service beyond voice telephony and therefore acts as a barrier to entry to the new, advanced
mobile services the Commission otherwise would
like to promote. '6

2

The Commission's encouragement of cellular
and broadband PCS carriers to enter the fixed
wireless market is inconsistent with the preclusive
effect of the CMRS spectrum cap. The Commission has stated that allowing CMRS providers to
offer fixed services will invigorate wireless competition in the local loop, thereby providing consumers with more service options. 1 63 As Bell At-

lantic Mobile notes, the distinction between
"mobile" and "fixed" will not be easily discernible
in the near future.

64

Furthermore, a wireless

provider may determine that a given technology is
the most viable choice for local loop service, but
be dissuaded from that option in favor of less effi65
cient or more limited alternative spectrum.
Technologies applicable to the local loop may not
develop-despite CMRS carriers' ability to focus
geographically-because the spectrum cap acts as
a direct roadblock to deployment of new and bettice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 25 - 26

(Jan. 25, 1999).
160

See generally NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 47 (noting

that "to the extent that incumbent licensees build networks
coupled with CMRS spectrum that are targeted mainly to mobile voice users, opportunities for entry and development of
competition in other services may be limited in the short to
medium term[,]" the FCC sought comment on "the extent to
which existing networks are capable of economically supporting the delivery of wireless services other than fixed or mobile voice and paging/messaging."). The Commission's par-

ticular concern is the "technical and economic feasibility of
offering dispatch, high-speed internet, and other two-way
data services over existing cellular, broadband PCS, and SMR
network platforms." Id.

161 See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulenaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 22, 24
(Jan. 25, 1999).
162

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY,
473-74 (1994)

THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

(observing almost universal agreement that government regulation constitutes the strongest barrier to entry and that a
regulation does not need to "deter entry expressly" to have its
preclusive effect). See also Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile,
Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-

205, at 22 (Jan. 25, 1999).
163 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to
Permit Flexible Service Offerings in the Commercial Mobile
Radio Services, 11 FCC Rcd. 8965, paras. 1, 2 (1997).
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ter services. 166 The spectrum cap thus distorts
market conditions, inhibits an efficient market
and serves to hinder the competition in the local
loop and convergence of services that the Com67
mission promotes elsewhere.
Finally, the Commission's rule discriminates in
favor of some services to the detriment of other
services. By retaining the spectrum cap, the Commission, discriminatorily limits spectrum ownership to some, but not all, service offerings. 168 It is
exceedingly difficult to reconcile such inequitable
application of a regulation with the FCC's policy
of encouraging fusion of mobile and fixed offerings 69 and its preference for market forces over
regulation as the factor that decides which providers and technologies prosper.170 As initially implemented, the cap only affected three of the
eleven CMRS technologies identified in 47 C.F.R.
§ 20.9(a) -cellular, PCS and SMR. 1 7 1 Ostensibly,
this distinction was based on rationales that no
longer exist: the other CMRS services were not viable competitors or used negligible amounts of
spectrum.172 Thus, the asymmetrical allocation of
spectrum runs contrary to the will of Congress,
which requires the Commission to seek regulatory
parity, rely on market forces to the extent possible
and promulgate the least intrusive regulations
17 3
necessary to implement its policies.
164
See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 30 (Jan.
25, 1999).
165
See supra note 154.
166
See Comments of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 16, n.45 (Jan. 25, 1999) (stating that

although wireless carriers can "cluster geographically" to provide service similar to a local exchange carrier, bandwidth
contstraints function as a "direct barrier to competition.").
167

See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the No-

tice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 26 - 27

(Jan. 25, 1999).
168
See id. at 29.
169 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to
Permit Flexible Service Offerings in the Commercial Mobile
Radio Services, 11 FCC Rcd. 8965, para. 3 (1997) (stating
that allowing CMRS providers to offer fixed services "will
stimulate wireless competition in the local exchange market,
encourage innovation and experimentation in development
of wireless services and lead to a greater variety of service offerings to consumers.").
170

See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the No-

tice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 29 (Jan.
25, 1999).
171

See id.

See id.
See H.R. CONF REP. No.103-213 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1179 - 81 (stating Congress' intent
172
173
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B.

Convergence as a Factor in Assessing the
Public Interest: Benefits of the Spectrum
Cap, Wireless v. Landline Competition and
the Deployment of New Services

Resolving whether and how the "convergence
and substitutability of other telecommunications
networks" 174 affects the viability of the spectrum
cap is essential to determining whether the cap
serves the public interest.1

75

As a preliminary

matter, it is worth noting that "the CMRS spectrum cap was.., not adopted based on any findings that it would promote wireless-landline competition or deployment of new services. These
policies were not mentioned as reasons for the
rule, nor is there any plausible basis today for linking these goals to such a limit.1

76

The Commis-

sion must affirmatively find a relationship between retaining the spectrum cap and the
promotion of wireless-landline competition if it
177
wishes to maintain the regulatory status quo.
Issues of causation aside, however, wireless is increasingly becoming an augmentation, if not a
substitute for, traditional wireline service. 178
to create a presumption that all CMRS providers will be
treated as common carriers subject to Title II regulation).
174
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 39 (listing wireline,
cable, private wireless, and satellite networks as potential platforms for converged services).
175
See id.
176
See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 21 (Jan.
25, 1999).
177
See id. ("[T]he cap cannot be maintained on these
grounds. Without evidence of that relationship, in turn, the
Commission cannot even reach the issue of whether the cap
would be the 'minimum restraint on the market necessary' to
achieve these objectives."). See also supra notes 48, 87 - 88.
178
See Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 16
(Jan. 25, 1999) (describing an explosive and expanding wireless marketplace that "is changing to meet consumer demand for high speed mobile data service and so-called 'thirdgeneration' ('3G') services, as well as other innovative service
offerings."). Projecting the growth of wireless minutes as a
percentage of total minutes reveals that while wireless accounted for 2.2% of total telecommunications minutes in
1994, it will grow to 7.3% by 2000, largely as a result of "migration of traffic from landline networks to mobile networks." Id. "Wireless penetration is expected to reach 50% of
the U.S. market by 2005. The increased demand for mobile
service will constrain capacity on those networks most successful in meeting this demand, potentially limiting service
quality and harming consumer interests if an artificial spectrum cap is maintained." Id.
179
See Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 8

Moreover, wireless data service promises to have
novel application and notable consumer demand.' 79 There is current, continuing research
aimed at enhancing mobile data services and
networking.'8 0 This is especially true as consumer
demand for "nomadicity" 'l l increases. 18 2 Such
"nomadicity" is also raising the level of demand
18 3
for wireless internet applications.
Nomadicity, however, does not come without
costs. Such broadband wireless services use immense amounts of spectrum.18 4 For example,
providing internet service at baud rates comparable to wireline modems requires much more
bandwidth than the vast majority of CMRS carriers can dedicate to such an endeavor.18 5 "Wireless carriers have had to deploy most of their spectrum to meeting the sharply increased demand
for mobile voice services, leaving little spectrum
available for widespread deployment of other
spectrum-intensive applications.' 1 6 CMRS carriers will require significantly more spectrum if true
competition with wireline is to be a reality.

(Jan. 25, 1999). See also Third CMRS Competition Report, supra
note 7, at 19815-16; Future of Smart Phones Isn't Waiting, MoBILE

PHONE NEws, Jan. 4, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 6607720;

Eoin Licken, New Data Age: Now, PortablePhones Aren't Justfor
Talking, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 21, 1999, available at
1999 WL 5109268.
lS0 See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 23 (Jan.
25, 1999). See also Mike Mills, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at El

(outlining alliances of major telecommunications players created to develop wireless telephones as internet access devices). Tracking the major deals to develop wireless phones
as internet access devices reveals several noteworthy examples:
Nextel of McLean will work with Netscape Communications and Unwired Planet to develop a Web browser for
its Motorola pocket phones. Microsoft will test its Windows CE operating system in pocket phones offered by
British Telecommunications. Cisco Systems and Motorola will join to develop products and standards for moving internet data over wireless networks in a $1 billion
deal.
Id.
181 See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 23 (Jan.
25, 1999) (defining nomadicity as the individual mobile use
of networked computers).
182
See id.
183
See id.
184
See id. at 24
185
See id. at 27.
186
Id. at 24.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

C.

Service to Rural Areas
The FCC is concerned that the "relative lack of

competition in certain rural and other markets
suggests that there is a continuing need for the
CMRS spectrum cap in those areas."1 8 7 The issue
here is to what degree, if any, the spectrum cap
impacts the capability of CMRS carriers to roll out
and competitively provide mobile voice and data
telephony in rural areas.1 88
In addressing this issue, it is important to note
that historically the Commission has promoted
service to highly profitable urban areas as a means
of subsidizing more costly rural areas. 189 After the
divestiture of AT&T, for example, revenues from
interexchange service subsidized the local loop
through access fees.' 90 This most recent policy of
universal service arose out of the Commission's
appreciation of the fundamental and unavoidable
economic principle that long distance providers
would seek to maximize profit through primarily
offering service to lucrative markets.' 9 1 Likewise,
in the CMRS markets, it is reasonable for wireless
providers to follow a similar strategy of primarily
targeting abundant urban markets. 19 2 This competitive phenomenon is magnified by the CMRS
93
licensing process.'
Allowing this competitive phenomenon to run
its natural course will allow CMRS carriers to develop sufficient revenues and economies of scale
to penetrate rural markets into which entry is curNPRM, supra note 15, at para. 46.
See id. at para. 47.
See 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
(providing that state public utility' commissions will designate "eligible telecommunications carriers" to provide telecommunications service to unserved areas and, accordingly,
qualify to receive support from the universal service fund).
187

188
189

190 See, e.g., In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, Third
Report and Order, 93 FCC 2d 241 (Mar. 11, 1983) ("[The] Universal Service Fund will.., continue to be recovered through
[and] will be designed to precarrier's carrier charges ....

serve universal service by enabling high cost local exchange
companies to establish local exchange rates that do not substantially exceed local exchange rates charged by other local
exchange companies.").
191 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Fifth Report & Order, 14 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 085, para. 6
(Oct. 28, 1998) (stating that without a system of universal ser-

vice, carriers would "enter markets where rates are artificially
high relative to costs, and would not enter markets where
would continue to
rates are kept artificially low [and] ....

have to serve the high cost customers without the offsetting
benefit of the high-profit revenue streams that previously

subsidized serving these high cost areas.").

See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the No192
tice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 19 (Jan.
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rently economically prohibitive.19 4 As margins for
CMRS carriers tighten in urban wireless markets-as they will continue to do if the spectrum
cap is removed-these carriers will seek to optimize revenue streams from national markets.
Joint ventures with rural carriers will allow wireless service growth to track commercial customers
that increasingly extend the reach of their goods
and services into non-urban areas in search of
profit. Indeed, development of nationwide cellular providers is advanced.19 5 While digital carriers
are aggressively marketing their own nationwide
plans to compete with the cellular providers, their
entry into rural markets has been partially limited. 19 6 Digital carriers currently do not reach approximately 20 percent of the nation's population.' 9 7 The fact that PCS and digital SMR
entrants offer service to "only" 80 percent of the
American population is not related to the spectrum cap. Rather, it is the high cost of delivering
service that slows deployment of digital mobile
voice telephony as a meaningful substitute for the
incumbent cellular providers in unserved areas.
Lifting the spectrum cap would afford existing
cellular providers the economy of scope to provide unserved customers voice and advanced services that are not otherwise available in the near
term. Incumbent status of cellular providers in
these unserved areas likely would not preclude
PCS and digital SMR entrants from entering the
25, 1999).
193

See id. ("Given that CMRS licenses were awarded

based on geographically defined markets, which have widely
varying populations, it should be expected that within the
five-year buildout period adopted by the Commission, competitors will enter first in urban areas with larger numbers
and concentrations of potential subscribers.").
194 See Comments of Bell South Corporation to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 8 (Jan. 25,
1999) (arguing that the spectrum cap precludes CMRS entrants from contracting with existing rural carriers, and
thereby avoiding the significant capital outlay necessary to offer service in underserved areas).
195 See id. at 20 (noting that Bell Atlantic Mobile and
AT&T Wireless offer their 'Single Rate' and 'One Rate' pricing schemes to both rural and urban consumers).

See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 45 (noting that as of
June 1998, PCS or digital SMR carriers had entered only
about forty percent of the nation's BTAs). See also Comments
of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of ProposedRulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 21 (Jan. 25, 1999) (citing new
infrastructure, switch upgrades and other up-front investments as factors that foreclose CMRS carriers from providing
competitive new services to rural markets under the spectrum cap).
197
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 45.
196
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markets as they build out their networks. In fact,
once incumbents are established, mandatory resale rules will make it more likely that new entrants will follow incumbents' lead into these currendy unserved areas because of reduced costs.1 9 8
Removing the spectrum cap will encourage PCS
and digital SMR providers to enter rural markets
and create service plans that truly are national in
scope. Promoting nationwide competition,. in
turn, likely will encourage CMRS providers aggressively to seek out rural markets that currently
are marginally profitable. 199
Retaining the spectrum cap would be counterproductive. Rather, the Commission should examine its own universal service policies for the appropriate economic model. Just as urban
customers subsidize service to rural subscribers
under universal policies, profits that CMRS carriers realize from urban customers-coupled with
the lower unit costs that would occur if the the
spectrum cap were lifted-will make service to unserved or underserved areas more appealing to
new and existing CMRS providers. The Commission must realize that much more spectrum is required in all markets to offer advanced services. 200
It would be insufficient merely to lift the cap in
rural areas.

Moreover, retaining the cap likely would foreclose CMRS carriers from introducing new services to unserved or rural areas because the huge
capital investment is unaccompanied by an equal
potential for acceptable returns.20 1 The economic reality that less competition exists in rural
areas persists whether or not there is a cap, because demand in those markets makes them apparently less profitable. 20 2 This economic reality is
especially compelling when one observes the
amorphous and shifting demographics of service
areas that defy the regulatory symmetry desired by
Congress. 20 3 Lifting the cap, however, will allow
CMRS providers to raise their supply curves incrementally as they seek to expand profit margins in
the face of nationwide competition. Thus, as
profit margins tighten due to increasingly nationwide competition and saturation of particular
markets, service to rural Americans will become
more attractive to CMRS providers, causing the
supply curve in rural areas to rise by corresponding increments. The Commission should seek to
foster a competitive environment in which CMRS
providers develop sufficient economies of scale to
enter rural markets in search of profit, thereby
putting spectrum for those areas to its most effi-

198 See In re Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845
MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's
Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, 86
F.C.C.2d 469, paras. 103-07 (1981). See also In re Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 18455,
para. 24 (1996).
199 See Reply Comments of the Rural Telecommunications Group to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt.
No. 98-205, at 3 (Feb. 10, 1999) (explaining that investors
and potential partners otherwise eager to invest their capital
reserves in rural wireless telecommunications companies are
stymied by the spectrum cap). See also Comments of Triton
Cellular Partners, L.P., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 2-3 (Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that many
institutional investors were eager to provide the substantial
capital investment that allowed Triton to deploy sixteen cellular systems - but only after Triton narrowly obtained a
waiver of the spectrum cap from the FCC). Other carriers
have not been successful in obtaining waivers of the spectrum cap. See also, e.g., supra note 68.
200
Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 33 (Jan. 25,
1999). '(stating that in order to deploy advanced services,

and other services in rural markets." Id.
201 See id. See also Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile,
Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98205, at 21 (Jan. 25, 1999) (citing new infrastructure, switch
upgrades and other up-front investments as factors that foreclose CMRS carriers from providing competitive new services
to rural markets under the spectrum cap).
202 See Comments of SBC Wireless, Inc., to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 7 (Jan. 25,
1999).
203 See id. (noting the dynamic and transient nature of
American demographics). The particular characteristics of
service areas compound the problem of shifting demographic patterns:
[D]ue to the way in which the MTAs are drawn, what
may be a rural cellular market ('RSA') could well be part
of an urban MTA. Also, due to population density, what
may be defined as a 'rural' service area on the east coast
is often equivalent to an MSA in a less densely populated
area, so the distinction would be hazy and virtually unen-

.considerably more spectrum .

.

. will be needed in all mar-

kets."). Denying CMRS providers the spectrum necessary to
deploy advanced services "simply because there are only a
certain number of other competitors, could thus undercut,
not promote, the offering of those advanced public safety

cient use. 20 4 Even if such economies of scale do

forceable. .

.

. As cities expand their reach, and bed-

room communities encroach on formerly non-urban areas, what may be rural one day could evolve into a
suburb of a large city by the simple construction of a few
housing tracts.
Id.
204 See Comments of BellSouth Corporation to the Notice
of ProposedRulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 13 (Jan. 25,
1999) ("[T]he Commission should focus on ensuring that
spectrum in rural areas is put to its highest and best possible
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not cause CMRS providers to enter rural markets,
lifting the cap nevertheless would benefit rural
Americans. 20 5 Removing the cap would free existing rural CMRS providers to offer a panoply of
wireless services. 20 6 It would be more advantageous to provide rural Americans an array of wireless services through one or two carriers, than
merely to provide limited wireless options
through a number of competitors. 20 7 Finally,
there are many alternative policies the Commission could promote that would have a more signif2 08
icant and lasting effect than the spectrum cap.

The spectrum cap is a competition-thwarting measure that impedes carriers' ability to develop the
revenue streams and economies of scale that are
necessary to make entry into rural markets economically viable. 20 9 Retaining the spectrum cap
would leave rural markets with only the most basic
wireless service, which, in comparison to the layers of services urban subscribers will enjoy, will
make rural Americans resemble "technopeasants."

2 10

V. OTHER RESTRAINTS OF
ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR SUGGEST
A MORE SENSIBLE REGULATORY
POLICY
Competition-eroding Spectrum
Consolidation?

A.
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consolidation could occur in the CMRS industry
absent the spectrum cap is unfounded because
various regulatory tools and specific market forces
will prevent such an occurrence. 2 1 ' Simultaneous
multi-round auctions, FCC authority to grant or
deny license transfers under Section 310(d), antitrust review by the DOJ and the FTC, private
rights of action and the cellular cross-interest rule
will adequately ensure that no firm can or will be
able to exercise market power.
While the Commission focuses on market
forces as a check on anticompetitive behavior, it is
necessary to recognize that there are significant
regulatory forces that will limit the size to which
CMRS providers will grow. The Department of
Justice's antitrust review, the Federal Trade Commission's power to assess civil damages for anticompetitive conduct and the FCC's public interest review, which subsumes the Commission's
authority under the Clayton Act, provide adequate safeguards against anticompetitive behavior
and undesirable consolidations.2 1 2 The DOJ and
the FTC possess an array of criminal and civil
sanctions that would deter and punish potential
anticompetitive behavior.2 1 3 Furthermore, the
DOJ and the FCC both maintain authority to prevent the consummation of mergers.2 14 Additionally, private rights of action augment governmen215
tal police powers.
The Commission may be inclined to decide that
the spectrum cap may result in certain regulatory

A concern that competition-eroding spectrum
use in a manner that promotes the public interest of rural
Americans.").
205
206

See id.
See id.

207
See Comments of BellSouth Corporation to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 12-13 Uan.
25, 1999) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit accepted the argument in BellSouth Corp. v. FCC that high cost and low-margin
characteristics of rural markets should cause the Commission
to focus on ensuring that spectrum in such areas is utilized in

a manner that most efficiently benefits rural Americans
where no other potential competitors are apparent).
208

See Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 17
(Jan. 25, 1999) ("[T]he flexible partitioning of broadband

PCS service areas and spectrum disaggregation, enforcement
of the Commission's build-out rules for smaller BTA broadband PCS licenses, and enhancing CMRS carriers' eligibility

for universal service support will do more to advance the deployment of new, competitive services to undeserved rural areas."). See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.203(a)-(b) (1998) (buildout
requirements) and 24.714 (partitioning and disaggregation);
In re Federal-State joint Board on Universal Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-

ing, 13 FCC Rcd. 21252, at paras. 74-78 (Oct. 26, 1998) (discussing elimination of rule).
See supra notes 187, 192-93.
209
210
David A. Irwin, The Effect of Emerging Technologies on
Rural Markets, Speech Before the National Regulatory Conference at New Mexico State University, Mar. 1999 (coining
the term "technopeasant").
211
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 38 (inquiring
whether there exist "dis-economies of scale that will limit the
size to which firms will grow, and thus tend to ensure that the
CMRS sector will assume a competitive structure even in the
absence of a spectrum cap.") The Commission also questioned whether it is "possible that capital markets will not finance attempts by individual firms to acquire spectrum in
amounts or construct systems of sizes that would threaten
competition." Id.
212 See supra notes 61 - 67. See also Comments of
Airtouch Communications, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 14 (Jan. 25, 1999).
213 See supra notes 61 - 67 and accompanying text.
214
See id.
215 The FCC elsewhere has indicated that the existence
of private rights of remedy is a justification for repealing regulation. See, e.g., In re Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast

Cutting the Cord

1999]

efficiencies that weigh in favor of its retention. 216
Such reasoning all but ignores the Commission's
own expressed regulatory policy to affirmatively
regulate only when identifiable market failure exists. 21 7 Moreover, Congress has consistently and

clearly signaled to the Commission that it should
not engage in "problem avoidance," but exercise
its regulatory authority in a proactive manner
when-and only when-the public interest so demands. 218 Conversely, "[w] here the rationale for
an agency's rule has been achieved, the rule
should no longer be retained. Agencies cannot
rely on original reasons for a rule where those reasons are no longer applicable."' 2 19 The significant
benefits of lifting the spectrum cap are not overcome by so-called regulatory efficiencies. 220 The
spectrum cap is unnecessary largely because the
prior approval processes of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act and the FCC's license
transfer authority under Section 310(d) serve to
prevent spectrum aggregation that might lead to
the exercise of market power through merger.
If concerns arise about potential market foreclosure because a competitor begins to amass too
much spectrum in a given service area, the FCC
Regulation, 59 RR 2d 1500 (1986).

See also, e.g.,

HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLIcy, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 455 (1994)
(noting that suits

brought by private plaintiffs account for approximately 90%
of all antitrust cases).
216
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 32 (explaining that
the Commission has found the spectrum cap to be an "administratively simple" method of promoting competition).
217
See supra note 102; see also NPRM, supra note 15, at
para. 3 (stating that if the Commission finds that a regulation
does not serve the public interest, it has an "affirmative obligation to repeal or modify that regulation.").
218
See id.
219
See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 14 (Jan.
25, 1999). See also Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (reversing an FCC decision retaining cable television
regulations after the factual predicate for the rules had

changed); Meredith v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(reversing a Commission decision where in a subsequent proceeding its finding "largely undermined the legitimacy of its

own rule."); Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(stating that "it is settled law that an agency may be forced to
reexamine its approach if a significant factual predicate of a
prior decision has been removed.").
220
See supra notes 68 - 77.
221
See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 11 (Jan.
25, 1999).
222
See id. at 10.
223
See NPRM, supranote 15, at para. 40 (stating that auctions of entrepreneur blocks C and F will help promote and
protect competition).

could also address them by enlarging the amount
of spectrum designated for mobile services by reallocating bandwidth. 22 1 In fact, the amount of
spectrum the Commission has allocated to CMRS
consistently has increased, more than tripling
from 50 MHz to 180 MHz since the cap was established. 222 To whom the Commission allocates
new spectrum also can protect and promote competition in CMRS markets. 223 Thus, rather than
"promoting" competition through restrictive regulatory mechanisms, the Commission should encourage wireless as a substitute for wireline service
through further spectrum auctions that would
provide opportunities that entice new competitors
into a market characterized by increasing consumer demand. 224 The fact that the Commission
can reallocate spectrum to CMRS in the event of
market foreclosure would tend to undercut any
competitor's attempt to roll out new wireless service. 225

Incumbent wireless carriers, therefore,

would be reluctant to expose the significant capital outlay necessary to introduce new wireless ser226
vice in a market subject to devaluation.
The regulations governing auctioning of new
wireless spectrum add another check on a single
224
See In re Implementation of Section 309(j) - Competitive Bidding, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2941, paras.
12-13 (May 10, 1994). The Commission followed the following principles when it designed its auctions:
(1) licenses with strong value interdependencies should
be auctioned simultaneously; (2) multiple round auctions, by providing bidders with information regarding
other bidders' valuations of licenses, generally will yield
higher revenues and more efficient allocations of
licenses, especially where there is substantial uncertainty
as to value; and (3) because they are relatively expensive
to implement and time-consuming, simultaneous and/
or multiple round auctions become less cost-effective as
the value of licenses decreases.... [S]imultaneous multiple round bidding was most likely to award interdependent licenses to the bidders who value them the most.
We also indicated that this method will facilitate efficient
aggregation of licenses across spectrum bands thereby resulting in vigorous competition among several strong service
providers who will be able rapidly to introduce a wide variety of
services highly valued by end users.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
225 See Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 12 - 13
(Jan. 25, 1999).
226 Assets committed by incumbents rightly could be
characterized as "sunk costs." See 1992 Merger Guidelines
§ 1.32 (defining sunk costs as "the acquisition cost of tangible
and intangible assets that cannot be recovered through the
redeployment of these assets outside the relevant market, i.e.,
costs uniquely incurred to supply the relevant product and
geographic market.").
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entity obtaining enough spectrum to exercise
market power. 227 Auctions of wireless spectrum
follow a procedure that allows for simultaneous
multi-round bidding. 2 28 Simultaneous multiround bidding is an open proceeding in which
CMRS providers that are vulnerable to a rival
competitor's attempt to exercise market power
are able to respond to such overtures with a
higher bid. 229 Accordingly, if the Commission

were to allocate additional spectrum to CMRS, it
would be in the interest of those providers whose
market share may be threatened by another competitor's acquisition of spectrum to pay not only
for the perceived intrinsic value of the spectrum,
but also to pay for the value of depriving a competitor the use of that spectrum. 230 It is probable
that the bidder seeking to establish market power
will not be willing to pay for more than the perceived primary value2 31 of the additional spectrum. 23 2 Thus, it is likely that any competitor's at-

tempt to exercise market power through
acquisition of spectrum likely would be thwarted
233
by the self-interest of rivals.
See generally In re Implementation of Section 3090) Competitive Bidding, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order,
9 FCC Rcd. 7245, paras. 39 - 42 (Aug. 15, 1994) (concluding
that disclosing the identity of bidders, along with the value of
the bids, will allow meaningful comparisons and accurate valuations of licenses among competitors).
228
See In re Implementation of Section 309 (j) - Competitive Bidding, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, para.
106 (Apr. 20, 1994).
229
See Federal Communications Commission: All About Auctions (last modified Mar. 8, 1999) available at <http:www.fcc.
gov/wtb/auctions> ("The principle advantage of a multiple
round auction for assigning spectrum is the information that
it provides bidders about the value other bidders place on
licenses."). The Commission acknowledges that the major
benefit of multiple round auctions is that it encourages strategic thinking:
This information [about the value that other bidders
place on spectrum] increases the likelihood that licenses
will be assigned to the bidders that value them the most
and will generally yield more revenue than auctions
where there is much uncertainty about common factors
that affect the value of a license to all bidders, i.e., who
bid and how much was bid.... In a multiple round auction, bidders need not guess about the value the second
highest bidder places on the license because bidders
have the opportunity to raise their bids if they are willing
to pay more than the current high bidder. Multiple
round bidding is also more likely than single round bidding to be perceived by participants and observers as
open and fair. No bidder can realistically argue that it
did not have the opportunity to obtain the license if it
was willing to pay enough.
227
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The Cellular Cross-Interest Rule

Unlike the spectrum cap, the cellular cross-interest rule is a much more limited barrier to competition, because, among other things, the Commission has discretionary enforcement. Section
22.942 of the Commission's rules forbids CMRS
licensees from holding an attributable interest in
other CMRS licensees in a given CGSA if the combination threatens competition.23 4 The fact that the
Commission may find in its informed discretion
that cellular providers' cross-interest does not
threaten competition makes it much less restrictive than the spectrum cap.
There are several reasons why the cross-ownership rule is worthy of retention. First, while competition exists in most markets,

235

the cross-inter-

est rule will help prevent two incumbent cellular
providers from joining forces to preclude a PCS
provider from entering one of the few markets it
does not serve already. Second, the rule does not
sweep in many beneficial and efficient mergers
and partnerships. 23

6

Finally, the rule will aug-

See, e.g., In re Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21,
and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Redesignate the 27.529.5 GHz Frequency Band, to Reallocate the 29.5-30.0 GHz
Frequency Band, to Establish Rules and Policies for Local
Multipoint Distribution Service and for Fixed Satellite Services, Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, andFifth
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 12545, at para. 171
(Mar. 13, 1997) (noting that although bidders in auctions
likely will base their bids on their evaluation of the intrinsic
value of the spectrum, some bidders "would have the additional incentive to protect their market power and preserve a
stream of future profits."); see also In re FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, WT Docket No. 97-150, Report,
1997 WL 629251 at *5 (Oct. 9, 1997) ("Auctions also provide
valuable information about the opportunity cost of spectrum
because they reflect the value that the next most efficient
firm places on the spectrum license. This information allows
both the private marketplace and policy makers to manage
spectrum more effectively.").
The perceived intrinsic value of the spectrum to offer
231
new or additional services as opposed to secondary effects of
diminishing a competitor's current market share.
See In re FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auc232
tions, WT Docket No. 97-150, Report, 1997 WL 629251 at *5
(Oct. 9, 1997) (noting that auctions encourage bidders to
value spectrum according to its most productive and innovative use).
See supra notes 221 - 224.
233
234
See supra notes 78 - 80.
See NPRM, supra note 15, at para. 81 (observing that
235
numerous markets are served by two broadband PCS providers, an SMR carrier and two cellular carriers).
See Comments of GTE to the Notice of Proposed
236
Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 98-205, at 30 - 31 (Jan. 25, 1999).
230
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ment current antitrust laws-as enforced by the
Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and private rights of action-to police an23 7
ticompetitive practices on a case-by-case basis.
The cross-ownership rule will not prove quite
the impediment to innovation that the cap is because it does not deny CMRS providers in underserved areas of low density the option of investment from entities with fallow capital reserves.
Furthermore, joint ventures with wealthy partners
may be permitted if the Commission finds there is
not threat to competition. 238 The rapidly growing
CMRS industry relies on access to large amounts
of investment capital, and reliance upon the crossownership rule in the place of the cap would reduce anxiety and reluctance among otherwise enthusiastic investors.

VI.

239

CONCLUSION

Promoting the wireless industry as a competitor-if not a substitute-in the local loop serves
the public interest, but the FCC needs to be careful not to overregulate. While it scarcely can be
denied that there is greater competition in the
wireless industry than before the spectrum cap
was implemented, the Commission fails to establish by any quantitative or qualitative means a
causal connection between present competition
and the spectrum cap. In this regard, the 45 MHz
cap is overbroad; the focus on sheer quantitative
measures of competition through HHI calculations has the effect of proscribing consolidations
that have desirable market efficiencies. The spectrum cap runs contrary to the will of Congress,
which requires the Commission to seek regulatory
237
238

See id.

See supra note 192.

symmetry and the least intrusive regulations necessary to implement its policies. The Commission's repeal of rules where it has found such
competitive conditions bolsters the argument that
it should remove the CMRS spectrum cap regulatory regime. The spectrum cap is superfluous because, in the face of meaningful competition, existing antitrust rules, private rights of action and
the cellular cross-interest rule are sufficient to
guard against anticompetitive spectrum aggregation that might lead to exercise of market power.
The regulations governing auctioning of new
wireless spectrum would add another check on a
single entity obtaining enough spectrum to exercise market power. The national marketplace
transcends the constraints of a designated service
area such that the FCC's analysis of the validity of
the spectrum cap cannot properly be restricted to
a particular service area definition. Lifting the
spectrum cap will encourage greater investment
in new wireless technologies. Mandatory resale
obligations make entry into unserved or underserved more attractive for new entrants. Finally,
retaining the spectrum cap would leave rural markets with only the most basic wireless service. The
result would be that in comparison to the layers of
services urban subscribers will enjoy, rural Americans would resemble technopeasants.
The Commission should remove the spectrum
cap, but retain the cellular cross-interest rule as a
reasonable discretionary check on exclusionary
practices. In doing so, the FCC will promote a
symmetrical, voluntary, and market-driven wireless industry that will provide the benefits of wireless technologies to all Americans.

239

See id.

